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I.

JURISDICTION

This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
R.

Utah

petition

Ct. App.
the Court

Mast

Construction

to review and

Company

reverse

and Ron Mast

its ruling

that

American Savings & Loan's trust deed has priority over Masts1
mechanics' liens.

II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Constitutional Provision, Statutes and Rules
(Set forth in full in Addendum B ) :
Former Art. VIIIf § 9, Utah Constitution

7

38-1-1 to 26, Utah Code Annotated (1974)

3

38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

5, 6f 8f 9, 10, 12

38-1-10, Ut£h Code Annotated (1953)

6

38-1-26, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

2, 4

57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1986)
Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

12
i, iii

Cases:
Build, Inc. v. Italasano, 398 P.2d 544 (Utah, 1965)

6

Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982)

8

- ii -

First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundely
600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)

5, 6, 10

Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983)

6

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah 1978)

6

Mitchell v. Shoreridge Oil Co.f 75 P.2d 110 (Cal.App. 1938)....3
Union Supply Co. v. Morris, 30 P.2d 394 (Cal. 1934)

3

Smith v. Gunnissy 144 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1944)

3

Brice Mortg. Co. v. Wodtke, 332 P.2d 1044 (Or. 1958)

3

III.

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, R.
Utah Ct. App.

Both parties argued

issues other than the one

upon which the Court based its decision.

Mast Construction and

Ron Mast are the Appellants and Petitioners.
is the Respondent.

American Savings

Masts believe the Court made its decision in

error, and was perhaps not well enough educated by the briefs of
respective counsel.

- iii -

IV.
The Court

appears

OVERLOOKED FACTS
to overlook

the

significance

of the

status of appellants as both direct parties and as assignees of
the rights of other lien holders.
The Court notes in its decision that this action is a
consolidation iOpinion p, 5.

of

actions

brought

by various

lien holders.

And in a footnote (Opinion p. 5, n. 1) the Court

observes that other

lien claimants have assigned their claims

and lien priorities to Ron Mast.
Intermountain Glass and Paintf

The assignors to Mr. Mast were

Inc. and Marathon Steel Company.

Additionally, Debenham Electric Supply Company assigned its lien
2
priority to Mast Construction Company. R-II-118; R-III-1182. "
The Court found ^ that Ron Mast had actual notice of the
deed

of

trust

prior

to

the

date

work

commencedf

and

then

concluded the trust deed is therefore valid and binding as to
Ron Mast and Mast Construction.

Opinion p. 7.

That finding

could not properly apply to the rights and priorities of other
lien claimants, or to the priority of the liens assigned to Mr.
T~. The actions consolidated are as follows: Debenham Electric
Supply Co. v. Electro Technical Corp., et aT77 Civil Number
C-85-1607; General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co.y et al.,
Civil
Number
C-85-3Q67;
and
American
Savings
and
Loan
Association v. Oakhills Partnership, et al.,
Civil Number
C-85-4855. See respondent's brief, p. 3.
2. This was pointed out in Appellant's Brief, p. 2.
3.
As discussed below, the Court ought not to have made a
finding of fact not made by the trial judge.
- 1 -

Mast and Mast Construction long after the occurrence of all
operative facts in this case.

V.
On the way

MISAPPREHENDED LAW

to establishing

the supposed

priority

of

American Savings' deed of trust the Court simply finds Ron Mast
had notice there would be such a deed.

Having so found, the

Court assumes mistakenly that it becomes unnecessary to analyze
whether work

commenced

before proper recording of the trust

deedf or to otherwise apply the mechanic's lien statutes.
The holding effectively emasculates Utah mechanics1 lien
law, and the adverse effect on the construction industry and
economy in general could be dramatic.

See Article, Appendix

Exhibit 1.

VI.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Petitioners incorporate all the arguments contained in
Appellant's Brief

and Reply Brief/

and offer

the following

additional analysis in support of this Petition for Rehearing.
A.

Appellants as assignees cannot have their rights

affected by a finding Ron Mast had notice.
are freely assignable.

Mechanic's liens

Section 38-1-26, UCA (1953), states:

All liens under this chapter shall be assignable
as other choses in action, and the assignee may
commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own
name in the manner provided herein.
- 2 -

It

is

apparent

the

legislature

intended

all

the

rights a

mechanic or materialman has to be assignable with the substantial rights afforded by law securely attached.
Mortg. Co, v. Wodtke, 332 P.2d

1044

Gunniss, 144 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1944) .

(Or. 1958);

394

Smith v.

The assignee may enforce

it precisely as if he were the original lienor.
Supply Co. v. Morris, 30 P.2d

See, Brice

See, Union

(Cal. 1934); Mitchell v.

Shoreridge Oil Co.y 75 P.2d 110 (Cal.App. 1938).
As stated above, Mast Construction is assignee of another
mechanic's lien holder, and Ron Mast is assignee of two other
mechanic's lien holders.

So some of Mast Construction's rights

and all of Ron Mast's rights

arise by assignment.

American Savings did not suggest to the Court in its
brief that the law was as the Court found it:

that actual

notice to Ron Mast would give American Savings' deed priority.
Surely this is because counsel had in mind the fact that Masts
were protected by their assignee status, not just their status
as general contractor.
After

finding

Ron Mast was put on notice, the Court

appears to overlook his (and Mast Construction's) true position
as assignee and states:
Because of the above, it is unnecessary to
analyze whether. . . placement of electrical
equipment
at the building
site constituted
commencement to do work for the purpose of
satisfying the mechanics' lien statutes, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1974). The validity of the
April 6, 1983 lien date is immaterial once the
priority
of
American's
deed
of
trust
is
established as to appellants.
- 3 -

The judgment of the court below that American's
deed of trust was valid and had priority over all
other liens is affirmed.
Opinion, p. 7 (emphasis supplied).

The bold faced portions of

the holding appear to contradict each other, or at least the
second appears to be a non sequitur as to the first.
If the Court leaves intact its holding, the effect is
unusual and undesirable.

Mast surely cannot purchase the rights

of others and still not better its position.
Debenham

Electric

Supply,

The liens of

Intermountain Glass and Paint and

Marathon Steel cannot have become less potent by being placed in
the hands of the general contractor.

And American Savings

cannot receive the windfall that would result if the fortuitous
transfer of the rights of certain mechanics lien holders to
others robs them of their priority.
All

the

above

flies

in

the

face

of

the

obvious

legislative intent in adopting 38-1-26, UCA (1953) (set forth in
full on page three).

What the statute gives in making liens

assignable, the Court's decision seems to take away.
The same public policy that creates a mechanics' lien
dictates it should be freely and effectively assignable.

In

this manner the unpaid lien holder who is unable, for financial
or other reasons, to sue on his claim, can still receive some
amount of

consideration for its labor or material.

The value

of the lien will be greatly reduced if it cannot enhance the
position

of

the

fellow

lien
-

4

holder
_

to

whom

it

is

sold.

Statutorily

allowing

the

assignment

and

leaving

the

lien

priority unaffected does not change the position or expectations
of the trust deed holder.
Here
after

it

is undisputed

occurrence

work,

recordings

trust

deedf

of

all

and

that

the operative

corrective

recording

the assignments

(commencement

of

cancellations/recordings

of

of mechanics'

facts

took place

liens,

etc.).

When

the

rights of the assignor lien creditors were vesting and obtaining
their priority, their holders had no material relation to any of
the

Masts.

assignment

Nothing

Ron

Mast

heard

or

long

can diminish the rights and priority

holders who later assign them to Masts.
defect

saw

(here notice)

found

before

the

of other lien

Phrased another way, a

in one lien cannot affect others.

And the assignee takes no more or no less than the assignor had
to give.
This situation is analogous to that in First of Denver
Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 526, 527 (Utah
4
1979). " There the mechanic's lien holder who was found to have
done

the

initial work

on the property

released

priority to the construction loan mortgagee.
that

the

release

was

final

and

would

its lien and

The release stated

apply

to

all

other

T". The First of Denver case is also noteworthy in light of the
controversy, not determined by the Court's initial Opinion, over
whether the placement of a power box and cable constituted
"commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for
the structure or improvement."
38-1-5, UCA (1953).
The Utah
Supreme Court held in that case that installation of sewer and
water lines in other parts of the same subdivision satisfied the
statute, even though it appears they would have been less
visible than the power box and cable here. 600 P.2d at 526.
- 5 -

mechanics'

lien holders.

600 P.2d at 526.

The Court held that

since the release occurred after the work performed by the other
lien holders in the casef it came after their lien rights had
already attached.
status as lien

600 P.2d at 527.
holders.

It could not affect their

They were entitled to the priority

date earned for them by the first performer of work on the
project, even though that lien holder had released that priority
as to himself and tried to do so as to the other mechanic's
lienors.

Id., citing 38-1-10, UCA (1953).

Like the lender

in First of Denver, American Savings

cannot overcome priority of all lien claimants merely because of
a loss of one's lien holder priority.
B.

This Court should not make a factual finding*

The

Court stated that in view of the fact Ron Mast is said to have
signed a subordination

agreement "we find that Ron Mast had

actual notice of the deed of trust" before work commenced.
Opinion p. 7.

Judge Jackson points out that the Court has

thereby made a factual finding that was not made by the trial
court.

Jackson, J., concurring, opinion p. 8.

a question of fact.

Actual notice is

Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983);

Opinion p. 6.
In cases of equity, some limited fact-finding ability
rests in the appeals court.
(Utah 1978).

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50

But this is not so in law cases (like this one).

Build, Inc. v. Italasano, 398 P.2d 544 (Utah, 1965).

See also,

former Art. VIII, § 9, Utah Constitution.
C. The Court has misread the mechanics' lien priority
statute (38-1-5, UCA). Utah's mechanics' lien scheme
establishes a lien upon property to which the lienor has added
value. Then it provides:
The liens herein provided shall relate back
tor and take effect as of, the time of the
commencement to do work or furnish materials on
the ground for the structure or improvement, and
shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or
other
encumbrance
which
may
have
attached
subsequently to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work
begun, or first material furnished on the ground;
38-1-5, UCA

(1953)(emphasis supplied).

There is no proviso

automatically making a trust deed prior to mechanics' liens if
the lienor

has actual notice of the deed.

Therefor, Masts

believe the decision of the Court misreads the statute.
It is true the section has a second half, which allows
actual notice to diminish a lien holder's rights.

The remainder

provides:
The liens herein provided shall relate back to,
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the
ground for the structure or improvement, and shall
have priority over . . . any lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no
notice and which was unrecorded at the time the
building, structure or improvement was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the
ground.
By

way

of

summary,

the

statute

provides

that

mechanic's lien holder has priority over the following:

- 7 -

the

1.

encumbrances attaching after the date the first work

was performed or first material was furnished, and

work,

2.

encumbrances attaching prior to the commencement of

but

recorded

after,

except

where

the

lien

holder

had

notice.
If
despite

American

the

Savings1

omissions

and

trust

deed

is

irregularities,

validly
the

recorded

above

statute

allows the Court to rule in its favor only if the recordation
date

(April 8, 20 or 26, depending on which is valid) precedes

the placement of the power panel and cable (or commencement of
other

work),

"commencement

or

if that placement

is held not

to constitute

to do work or furnish materials on the ground."

If there was not a proper trust deed,

if it was not properly

notarized or if it was not duly recorded before work commenced,
the statute allows the Court to rule in American Savings1 favor
only as to lien holders who had notice of the trust deed.
Unfortunately
above,

applying

the

Court

the notice

went

escape

straight

clause

to

number

to benefit

two

American

Savings without first ruling on whether work was performed or
material
lien.

furnished

prior

to

attachment

of

American

Savings'

This despite the fact that "commencement to do work" is

construed in favor of lien claimants as a general rule.

Calder

Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
The opinion

is free of any analysis of the two issues

pointed out by the Court (Opinion p. 6 ) :
- 8 -

(1)

was

the

appeared

on

omissions
placed
the

recording
April

thereon

under

6,

the

1983

and

oath;

electrical

April

8,

of

equipment

1983,

of

trust

in

view

effective

that

and

deed

the

signators

(2)

did

the

at

the

building

constitute

as
of

the

were

not

placement

commencement

it

site

to

do

of
on
work

for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974).

Opinion p. 6.
In
briefs

light

and

of

the

treatment.

all

the

facts

of

seal

nevertheless
cases

the

case,

cited
these

cited

Masts'
deserve

and

valid
by

the

the amount of the secured debt, the
full

address

so as to impart

Mast

(brief

of

the

constructive

17-22)

which

should rule on whether re-recording a deed

but

the

issues

notary

notice.

require

affirmation must be followed or distinguished.

crossing

in

It is far from clear that a deed so vague as to omit

the name of the trusteef
corporate

authorities

oath

is
The
or

And the Court

(and simultaneously

out the former priority date), with corrections made

without

a

new

signature

or

jurat,

is

valid.

concurring opinion noted,
[wlithout addressing whether the April 8 trust
deed from Oakhills* general partner to American
was legally effective to create a lien, the
majority has determined that it was "valid and
binding" on Ron Mast and his company.
Jackson, J. concurring, p. 8.
- 9 -

As

the

D.
economy.

The

opinion

sets

a

precedent

dangerous

to the

Clearly the mechanics' lien priority section (38-1-5,

UCA) exists to provide special protection to those adding to the
value of property.

First of Denver Mortg. v. C. N. Zundel &

Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-525.

The decision of the Court seems

to put that public policy at grave risk.
The Court found Masts had notice simply because on March
28 Ron Mast

signed

a subordination

agreement

(which nobody

argues subordinates Masts' liens to American Savings.

However,

the only knowledge that would actually be imparted to Masts by
that agreement would be the fact there would be a loan by
American.

As Judge Jackson noted:

That agreement, however, does not mention anything
about an existing or planned trust deed on the
project site from Oakhills to American as security
for the construction loan.
Jackson, J. concurring p. 8.

The potential lien holder on a

project of any substantial size will know a loan is likely quite
as well as Ron Mast knew it.

Where will the line be drawn, if

not precisely where the statute dictates?
The

subordination

agreement

that was

thought

by

the

majority to have imparted notice was executed long before the
trust deed was even executed.

The statute provides for notice

to strip the lien holder of priority only if he had notice of
the "lien, mortgage or other encumbrance."

38-1-5, UCA (1953).

For purposes of the statute, can one have notice of a document
- 10 -

that has not even come into existence?
More perplexing still: Is knowledge or reason to know
that a loan will be needed tantamount to notice of the resulting
trust

deed

lien?

Mr,

contemplated should not
precedent

that

disincentive

get

knowledge

that

strip him of his lien.

gives

to

Mast's

potential

acquainted

a

loan

Do we desire a

laborers/suppliers
with

the

was

project

every

and

its

participants?
The

lien

predictability

priority

statute

is

in this area of the law.

Court does the opposite.

set

up

to

create

The decision of the

Judge Jackson noted:

I am concerned thatf
under the majority's
reasoning, no person who supplies material or
labor on a construction job bigger than a child's
sandbox will ever be able to achieve lien priority
over an entity that loans money on the project.
Every materialman on any job big enough to look
like it requires financing will be charged with
knowing or having reason to know thatf at some
unknown future timef the lender will require the
borrower to execute a deed of trust to secure a
loan. This result undermines the purpose of the
mechanics' lien statute. . . .
Jackson, J. concurring p. 8.
E.
prevails

All else being equal, the Mechanics1 Lien Statute
over

trust

deed

law.

In

effect,

the

Court has

determined that the entity adding value to the realty by its
labor or materials must strictly comply with the statute (as to
commencement of work, filing the lien, etc.), but the lender
need only approximate what the law requires.
- 11 -

A material defect

(such as omitting the name of the trustee and the amount of the
lien, or failure to swear the persons executing the deed) cannot
be winked at in the trust deed, and result in a finding that it
somehow supplies constructive notice as against the building and
supplier.
The Court
statute,

but

57-1-6 UCA
lien

does not quote

only

the

on validity

of

lien priority
a trust

deed.

This is insufficient, since the mechanics1

(1986).

priority

statute

the mechanics'

statute

clearly

governs,

and

by

its

terms

supersedes an otherwise proper trust deed, except under certain
circumstances.

38-1-5

UCA

(1953) . It is true that the trust

deed section provides that a trust deed is valid as to third
persons with

notice

57-1-6

(1986) .

UCA

even if it is not properly
As

Construction had no notice.
apply to them

discussed

above,

acknowledged.

Mast

and

Mast

And even if they did this would not

in their capacity

as assignees of lien holders

without notice.
The only defect actual notice overcomes in the trust deed
statute is a failure to properly prove, acknowledge or record
the document.

The other defects here present are not excepted.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Court based its decision on a theory which was not
argued,

either

for

or against,

by

either

party,

treat the issues presented in any of the briefs.
- 12 -

and did not

Undue emphasis

was placed on notice, and the Court misread the statutes, made a
factual

finding not made in the lower court, and failed to

consider the effect of the assignment of various liens to Masts*
The

net

result

emasculates

the mechanics1

lien's

statutory

protection.

VIII.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Mast Construction and Ron Mast jointly request that the
Court rehear this appeal, considering each of the arguments made
in the respective briefs on file, and reverse the holding of the
trial court.

The Court should find the Masts have priority over

American Savings, or grant a new trial.

Respectfully so requested this twenty-fourth day of June,
1988.

Ronald C. Barker & Mitchell RT^
Barker, attorneys for Ron Mast
and Mast Construction Company

- 13 -

IX. CERTIFICATE OP SER/ICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to
be hand delivered (four copies) on this twenty-fourth day of
Junef 1988f to:
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Warren Patten
W. Cullen Battle
Attorneys for Respondent
215 South State Street
Floor 12
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

fonald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
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ADDENDUM A: Article from Enterprise

Volume 17, Number 51

Monday, June 20

Judge blasts appeals court $3.4 foi
ruling as opening Pandora c r pHjt /
box against lienholders
by Barbara Rattle
Managing Editor

Utah's Court of Appeals
issued a decision last week that
one judge, critical of the majority's reasoning, said renders
it impossible for any person
who supplies material or labor
on a construction job "bigger
than a child's sandbox" to ever
be able to achieve lien priority
over an entity that loans money
on the development.
"Every materialman on any
job big enough to look like it requires financing will be charged
[under the majorit\ 's reasoning!
with knowing or having reason
to know that, at some unknown
future time, the lender uil! require the borrower to execute a

Nafl trucking
firm scouting SL
for substantial
terminal site
by Teresa Browning-Hess
Staff Writer

The Pride Lease Co. division of Crete Carrier Corp., a
Lincoln, Nebraska-based common and contract carrier trucking company active throughout
the country, is scouting the Salt
Lake area for a site suitable to
house a major terminal operation it plans to establish here
this summer.
Accoridng
to
Tonn
Ostergard, executive vice president and chief operating officer
of the privately-held concern,
Crete Carrier's Salt Lake facility will help to implement the
romn^nx'*^

r>}^n

to

evrmnr]

deed of trust to sccuie a loan,"
wrote Judge Norman H.
jackson. "The majority's decision requires the materialman to
become a fortune teller, thereby
opening Pandora's box in cases
where predictability is needed."
The case involved an appeal
see COURT page two

|

}

*

,

*

«*

l

-

by Teresa Browning-*
Staff Writer

San Jacinto Savir
billion-asset financial
based in Houston, wi
a large scale credit a
tion in Salt Lake th.
that could ultimate!
upwards of 150 peop
San Jacinto presic

;

Great Western, fleet now exceeds 700 pieces of equipment

91 new pieces of equipment ordered

Great Western Leasin
makes $1.5 mil. purch,
by Barbara Rattle
Managing Editor

Salt Lake City's Great
Western Leasing, a national
lessor of semi tractors and
trailers, is investing more than
$1.5 million in the acquisition of
91 new pieces of equipment, including the concern's first purchase of "bobtail" or straight
trucks, prompting a corresponding expansion of the firm's

noting Great Western
chased fi\e Whin
semi tractors, 12 Fr<
semitractors, 61 Gre
flatbed and dropdeck
10 utility flatbed tra
three 18-foot Hino va
The latter are a new ac
the type of equipme
Western has availa
noted.
Both thr ^nlf J PV

looking at "a variety of other
enterprises in Salt Lake." He
added the Houston group is in
-the b e g i n n i n g stages of
negotiations" to acquire the
credit card portfolio of iTirm
already established.in the area,
but declined to reveal the
party's identity.
"from a banking 'standpoint, Utah has reasonable
credit card provisions and a fine
labor base — those two factors
combined make it a great place
for us to do business. We're a
well capitalized organization
and we believe our move into
Salt Lake will be good for the
community as well as good for
us," Larson observed.
San Jacinto Savings was
founded in 1955 in Houston
and was acquired by its parent
company, the mammoth

Candy
(continued from page one)

several factors, including local
distribution accounts, the labor
force and need for more space
in which to launch the new line.
"Because several of our
distributors are located here, we
thought it would be advantageous to be closer to them,"
he said.
Plans call for the addition of
more than 100 employees to
Sweet T h a n k s '
current
workforce of 14 by the end of
the summer to manufacture the
ne* candy product, which for
reasons of competition Taylor
declined to discuss at present.
"He added, "the labor
force is more plentiful here."
Around 90 percent of the
group's product is distributed
out-of-state, said Taylor, who
anticipates the new line will be
ready for national sale in 40
days.
A 100 percent gross sales increase is projected because of
the new candy line, he said.

Institution maintains 21 branches scattered throughout Texas
and boasts assets of approximately S3.4 billion.
Larson attributed San Jacinto's ability to weather Texas'
poor economy while ,*till
posting substantial profits 'to a
well diversified asset base that is
spread nationwide. 1 4 We
haven't concentrated on one
specific geographic area and are
thus not dependent on the
economic ups and downs of one
particular region," ^he explained.

Stanley, who was instrumental
in establishing Western Savings
of Arizona's credit card operation in Salt Lake last year, to
organize its local efforts as well.
According to Stanley, who currently serves as bank card director for the Texas concern, "Salt
Lake was such a positive move
for Western that we thought
we'd try to duplicate that suc-cess ourselves."
Stanley indicated he found
Salt Lake's work ethic and
lifestyle to be "very conducive"
to a business environment.

Court
(continued from oaoe one)

by Ron Mast and Ron Mast
Construction Co., on their own
behalf and as assignees of the
rights of other holders of liens
against the local Oakwood Hills
condominium project, from the
lower court's finding that a
deed of trust filed by American
Savings & Loan to secure a loan
made to the project's developers
was valid and has priority over
all other liens against the
development.
The original deed was filed
April 8, 1983, but contained a
number of omissions. Mast
daimed an April 28 lien placed
by him against the project had
priority over the deed because
of its failure to conform with
legal standards.
However, the majority
found that Mast had "actual
notice" of the deed as required
by law prior to its being filed,
regardless of any omissions.
The majority relied on Mast's

having signed a subordination
agreement on March 28, 1983
that informed him that
American was loaning money
for the project on which he and
other lien claimants eventually
worked.
Judge Jackson, while agreeing the alleged defects in the
April 8 deed didn't deprive it of
its legal validity or recordabflity,
did express concern with the
majority's reliance on the
subordination agreement as
having provided Mast with actual notice. The agreement, he
said, does not mention anything
about an existing or planned
trust deed on the project site
from Oakhills to American as
security for the construciton
loan. "I fail to see," he said,
"how it proves that Mast had
actual notice of a deed of trust
that was not even executed until
after the subordination agreement was signed."
(Case No. 860355-CA).

ESI Auto Leasing secures new site on State Street
E.S.I. Auto Leasing has
secured an 8,200 square foot
location at 6885 So. State St. in
a transaction conducted

FLEET DISCOUNTS
on muffler, exhaust
and tail pipe work.
Quality Workmanship
A n d Fpir prirpc

through Tai Biesinger and Ken
Keller of Pentad Properties and
Bill Zimmerman of Coldwell
Banker Commerical.
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ADDENDUM B

Constitutional Provision, Statutes and Rules

Former Art. VIII, § 9, Utah Constitution

38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

38-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

38-1-26, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1986)

Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

ART.

VIII, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Cross-Reference.
Statutory provisions,$78-5-l et soq.
Appeals to district court.
here a justice of peace court was withjurisdiction to bear and adjudicate the
bject m a t t e r of an action commenced
erein, a district court to which an appeal
IB taken did not acquire jurisdiction of
{the action, even though district court
ifeould have had original jurisdiction of
Ahe subject m a t t e r of the action. B u r t &
T a r l q u i s t Co. v. Marks, 53 IT. 77, 177 P .
224.

r

Consolidating of city and justices' courts.
Uniting or consolidating of city and
justices' courts in different cities of state
held valid. Leatham v. Eeger, 54 U. 491,
182 P. 187.
Legislative control in general.
When last sentence in this section was
inserted in Constitution, it had reference
to law then in force, and construction of
existing statutes by Supreme Court was
part thereof. JSriscoe v. Rich, 20 U. 349,
58 P. 837.
Former statute, analogous to ^8-5-1 et
seq., held not enlargement of jurisdiction
of justice of peace as it stood at time
Constitution was adopted, and not invalid
under last sentence in this section. Briscoe v. Rich. 20 U. 349, 58 P . 837.
This section confers on legislature
power to restrict jurisdiction of justices
of peace by general law, but not to prescribe jurisdiction for justices in particular localities of state different from t h a t
possessed by justices in state at large.
Love v. Liddle, 26 U. 62, 72 P. 185, 62
L. R. A. 482.
Under this provision, legislature may
determine of what matters, and when and
how justices' courts shall acquire and exercise jurisdiction. State ex rel. Gallagher
v. Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake Countv, 36 U. 68, 104 P . 750.

P a r t of state's judicial system.
Justices of peace courts constitute part
of judicial system of Utah, In re Wiseman, 1 U. 39.
Collateral References.
JDttBtJces of the P$a£e4S&, 31 "el seq.
51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 4, 26
et seq.
47 Am. J u r . 2d 920, 937, Justices of the
Peace §§ 2, 30 et seq.
Arrest, power of justice of the peace
to take affidavit as basis for warrant of,
16 A. L. R. 923.
Compensation per diem, 1 A. L. R. 296.
Fault or omission of justice of peace
regarding bond, undertaking, or recognizance as affecting p a r t y seeking appeal, 117 A. L. R. 1386.
Judgment, prior action in justice's
court in which claim might have been
asserted by counterclaim, set-off, or cross
petition as bar to subsequent independent
action on such claim, 8 A. L. R. 735.
License, liability for refusing to grant,
85 A. L. R. 299.
Pardon as restoring justice to office
forfeited bv conviction, 47 A. L. R. 543,
143 A. L. R. 172.
Search warrant, civil liability for improper issuance of, 45 A. L. R. 609.
Set-off as between judgments, jurisdiction of justice of peace to order, 121 A.
L. R. 480.
Summons or notice of commencement
of action emanating from justice's court,
effect of defects or informalities as to
appearance or return dav in, 6 A. L. R.
851, 97 A. L. R. 752.
When title to real property deemed
involved within contemplation of statute
providing t h a t justice of the peace (or
similar court) shall not have jurisdiction
of matters relating to title of land, 115
A. L. R. 504.

Sec. 9. [Appeals from district court—Prom justices' courts.]
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right
of appeal to the Supreme Court. *The appeal shall be upon the record
made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and
*fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall
be provided by law. fAppeals shall also lie from the final judgment of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on
both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on
260
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such appeals shall be final, except in cases iinolvhig the validity or constitutionality of a statute.
Cross-Reference.
Appeals generally, Rules of Ci\ il Procedure, Rules 72-70.
Appeal and review generally.
Since the Constitution guarantees appeals to the Supreme Court, the proceedings relating thereto, in case the jurisdictional steps h a \ e been taken, must he
liberally construed so as to effectuate the
exercise of the right rather than to obstruct it by strict construction. Roberson v. Draney, 54 U. 525, 182 P. 212.
In absence of any specific legislative
provision regulating proceduie in appeals
from judgment or order of director of
department of registration in revoking
or refusing to re\oke physician's license
Supreme Court has authority and duty to
direct the procedure that shall be followed.
Baker v. Depaitment of Registration, 78
U. 424, 3 P. 2d 1<J82.
When opinion of trial court is settled
in bill of exceptions and made part of
record on appeal, the opinion may be
examined to ascertain the reason for the
decision although it amounts to no judicial finding of fact and has no judicial
effect whatsoe\er, since there is no decision until findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and decree or judgment aie signed
by the judge and filed with the clerk.
Wasatch Oil Ri^f. Co. v. Wade, Judge, i»2
l T . 50, 63 P . 2d 1070.
Right to appeal is valuable i.nd constitutional right and should not be denied
except where it is clear that right ha*
been lost or abandoned. Adamson v.
Brockbauk, 112 V. 52. 1S5 P . 2d 264.
Wheie*an appeal f?mn an into? locutoi %
order permitting d w o \ e i \ i m o h e s issuer
of fact, and there aie no findings- of f . a t ,
the Supreme Court does not re\ iew the
facts but assumes th.it the trier of the
facts found them in accord with its decision; the Supreme Court affirms the
decision if from the evidence it would be
reasonable to find facts to suppoit it.
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 V. 1, 245 P. 2d
224.
Premature filing of notice of appeal
from denial of motion for wiit of habeas
corpus did not d e p i a e the Supreme Couit
of jurisdiction wheie the judgment as filed
was in accoid with the ruling appealed
from. Wood v. Turner, 18 U. (2d) 229,
419 P. 2d 634.
Appeal to district
court.

court from

justice's

Neither thi<* section nor statutes authorized city to appeal to district court fioni

justice's court judgment in favor of accused in piosecution for ordinance violation. Castle Dale City v. Woolev, 61 U.
291, 2 1 - P. 1111, followed in 71 U. 328,
265 P. 1117.
Appeal to Supreme Court from juvenile
court.
Hearings in the juvenile court as to the
custody of children are equitable, and the
Supreme Court is chaiged with responsibility for reviewing the evidence. State
in Interest of K— B—, 7 U. (2d) 398, 32G
P. 2d 395.
Appeal to Supreme Court where case originated in justice or city court.
Laws of territory controlled right of
appeal to Supreme Court from judgment
of territorial district court on appeal from
judgment of justice of peace, even though
appeal to Supieme Court was not perfected until after statehood. Hodson v.
Union Pac. Ry. Co., 14 U. 381, 46 P. 270.
Appeal lies to Supreme Court in every
case which originates in justice's (or city)
court and in which validity or constitutionality of statute or city ordinance is
drawn into question in, and is decided by,
or ought to be decided b } , district couit
on appeal to it; Supieme Court has no
-jurisdiction to consider any question not
affecting validity or constitutionality of
statute or ordinance. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 U. 5S, 48 P. 41, affd. 173 ' l ' . S. 32,
43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct. 317; Post v. Foote,
IS U. 235, 54 P. 975; State v. Briggs, 46
1T. 23V, J4C P. 261; P a i k Citv v. Daniels,
46 U. 554, 149 P. 1094, Ann." Cas. 1918E,
107, Salt Lake City v. Lee, 49 U. 197,
161 P. 926; State \ . Roberts, i)(] V. 136,
190 P. 351; State v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563,
200 P. S94, 26 A. L. R. 696; Logan Citv
v. Blotter, 75 V. 272, 284 P. 333; Stat*
v. L \ t e , 75 U. 283, 2S4 P. 1006; Bountiful
City v. Granato, 77 V. 133. 292 P. 205;
Ameiican Fork Citv v. Robinson, 77 t \
168, 292 P. 249; Salt Lake Citv v. Perkins,
122 U. 43, 245 P. 2d 1176; Salt Lake Citv
v. Giameii, 16 U. (2d) 245, 398 P. 2d 888,
appeal dismissed 382 U. S. 23, 15 L. Ed.
2d 17, S. Ct. 227; Salt Lake Citv ^
Peters, 22 L\ (2d) 127, 449 P. 2d *652;
State v. Robinson, 23 I \ (2d) 78, 457 P .
2d 969.
Wheie question as to validity of constitutionality of statute has been raised
before district court, on appeal from justice's court, Supieme Court, on re\ iew,
must affirm judgment if question was correctly adjudged; Supreme Court must
further inquire whether, notwithstanding
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error in deciding statutory question, there
was decided any other matter or issue,
not affected by statutory question, which
in itself is sufficient to sustain judgment,
and, if such is case, judgment must be affirmed, without determining whether adjudication on such other matter or issue is
correct; if statutory question is of such
force as to render correct decision thereof
necessary to final adjudication, or if there
has been no decision of any other matter
or issue, not affected by statutory question, sufficient to sustain judgment of
district court, Supreme Court will reverse
judgment and direct .proper judgment to
be entered, or remand cause, as may be
required by circumstances of each particular case. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 IT. 53,
48 P. 41, affd. 173 U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed, 603,
19 S. Ct. 317.
Exception, in last clause of this section,
applies when validity or constitutionality
of city ordinance, as well as when validity
or constitutionality of statute, is involved
in case originating in justice's court.
E u r e k a Citv v. Wilson, 15 U. 53, 48 P. 41,
affd. 173 XL S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct.
317.
Under this section, appeal may be taken
to Supreme Court in all cases originating
in justices' courts in which validity or
constitutionality of statute or ordinance
is drawn in question, made issue, and
decided by district court on appeal; in all
other cases transferred to district court
from justices' courts, final judgment of
district court is conclusive. Ogden City
v. Grossman, 17 U. 60, 53 P. 9S5, following
Eureka Citv v. Wilson, 15 U. 53, 48 P. 41,
affd. 173 U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct.
317. In Ogden City case, district court
held unconstitutional city ordinance which,
in justice's court, defendants had been
found guilty of violating. However, in
Town of Ophir v. Jorgensen, 63 IT. 288,
225 P. 342, in which, seemingly, there was
raised no question of constitutionality of
town ordinance involved and only question at issue was as to town's right to
appeal from district court's judgment in
action, originating
in justice's court, for
violation of ordinance, court said at p.
290 of 63 U t a h : "This court, in the case
of Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 U. 00, 53
P. 985, did entertain an appeal from the
district court in a criminal case brought
under a city ordinance
* * *. But
* * * that, case is not reasoned upon
this question; the statutes and constitutional provisions and general legal propositions involved are not discussed. The
case ought to be deemed overruled, by implication, bv the doctrine of Castle Dale
City v. Woolley [61 U. 291, 212 P. 1111]
and the holding in Salina Citv v. Freece,"
01 U. 574, 216 P. 1078.

Supreme Court has no power, on appeal
in case originating in justice's court, to
determine whether district court's construction of particular statute was erroneous. State v. Olsen, 18 IT. 484, 56 P. 22.
Where case, originating in justice's
court, did not involve validity or constitutionality of statute, and unsuccessful
plaintiffs had right of appeal to district
court but, instead of appealing, petitioned
district court for writ of prohibition and
by petition raised same questions that had
been raised in justice's court, appeal to
Supreme Court could no more be taken
from judgment of district court dismissing
petition for writ than it could have been
taken from adverse judgment of district
court on appeal to it. Overland Gold Min.
Co. v. McMaster, 19 U. 177, 56 P. 977.
The word " s t a t u t e " in last clause of
this section includes municipal ordinances.
P a r k City v. Daniels, 46 U. 554, 149 P .
1094, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 107.
A city cannot appeal from the judgment of the district court in criminal
action for violation of ordinance where
the action originates in the court of a
city justice. Salina City v. Freece, 61 IT.
574, 216 P. 1078.
This section does not authorize a city
to appeal from judgment on appeal from
city court to district court, dismissing defendant from custody, even though constitutionality of ordinance under which
defendant was prosecuted was involved.
Town of Scipio v. Olsen, 71 U. 328, 265
P. 1117, following Castle Dale Citv v.
Woolley, 61 U. 291, 212 P. 1111.
This section applies to and limits appeals to Supreme Court from the district
court in criminal cases, where case originated in city court, and was first appealed
to district court. State v. Brown, 75 U.
37, 282 P . 785.
Certiorari from Supreme Court to review
judgment in case originating in justice
or city court.
Supreme Court may, by certiorari, review decision or judgment of district court
in case appealed from justice of pence,
even though validity or constitutionality
of statute is not involved, where district
court exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to
acquire jurisdiction. Hansen v. Anderson,
21 U. 286, 61 P . 219 distinguishing Crooks
v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 21 V.
98, 59 P. 529, and overruled in Smith v.
District Court of Second Judicial Dist.,
24 IT. 164, 06 P. 1065 (Baskin, J., dissenti n g ) . (In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v.
District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 30
U. 371, 85 P. 360, court "adhered'' to
Crooks and Smith cases, and did not mention Hansen case, but did, in effect, return to doctrine of latter case.)
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Action of district court in dismissing,
for want of prosecution, case appealed
from justice court but not involving
validity or constitutionality of statute,
held final and not subject to review by
Supreme Court on certiorari; certiorari
may not be used to have mere errors or
mistakes of district court reviewed. Smith
v. District Court of Second Judicial District, 24 U. 164, 66 P. 100"), construed and
adhered to in Oregon Short Line R. Co. v.
District Court of Third Judicial District,
30 IT. 371, 85 P . 360.
Where judgment was rendered in district court in favor of plaintiff in action
before justice of peace and taken to district court by appeal, and it was shown
that district court had exceeded its jurisdiction, Supreme Court had power by certiorari to review such jurisdictional question, such judgment not being reviewable
by further appeal. Oregon Short Line P .
Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial
Dist., 30 IT. 371, 85 P. 360.
The mere fact t h a t court misconceives
the law and acts contrary thereto in matter where it has jurisdiction of subject
matter does not carry such act beyond
jurisdiction of court, and its action is not
reversible on certiorari; dismissal of appeal from justice's court by district court
on theory that undertaking, as required
by law, had not been filed in justice's
court, held not to exceed jurisdiction of
district court, and such dismissal was not
reviewable on certiorari. Hoffman
v.
Lewis, 31 U. 179, 87 P. 167.
Equity as distinguished from law case.
The Supreme Court, in cases at law
tried before court without a jury, will
examine the evidence only so far as may
be necessary to determine questions of
law, and it will not pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to justify finding
or judgment, unless there is no legitimate proof to support it and in no case,
whether tried with or without a jury, will
the appellate court determine questions
of fact. Lvman v. Town of Price, 63 IT.
^ 0 , 222 P.* 599.
Since this section provides that in cases
of law the appeal shall be on questions of
law alone, where evidence was conflicting
in law .action and there was substantial
evidence to support findings below, Supreme Court would not weigh evidence but
would affirm judgment. Osborn v. Peters,
69 U. 391, 255 P. 435.
Trial court cannot merely take the evidence in equity case and certify record
to Supreme Court for disposition of evidentiary issues. In re Thompson's Estate,
72 U. J7, 269 P. 103.
A will contest is an action at law, not
an equity case, and Supreme Court on ap-
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peal cannot weigh and pass on conflicting
evidence. In re Alexander's Estate, 104
IT. 286, 139 P. 2d 432.
As suit in equity to have a deed, absolute in form, declared to be a mortgage,
is a suit in equity, it is duty of Supreme
Court, under this section of the Constitution, to review the facts. "In examining
the transcript to determine what our conclusions from the evidence will be we are
to make an independent analysis of it.
If at the end of that investigation we are
,in doubt or even if there be a slight preponderance in our minds against the trial
court's conclusions we will affirm." Crockett v. Nish, 106 U. 241, 147 P. 2d 853,
following earlier Utah case.
I n a case at law, the appeal is upon
questions of law alone. That being true,
the function of the Supreme Court is not
to pass upon the weight of the evidence,
nor to determine conflicts therein, but to
examine it solely for the purpose of determining whether the judgment finds substantial support in the evidence. Sine v.
Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147
P. 2d 875.
Action to quiet title to land would be
considered as action at law rather than
suit in equity with respect to extent of
review on appeal, where no equitable issues were involved. Dahnken v. Geo.
Komnev & Sons Co., I l l U. 471, 184 P. 2d
211.
This section precludes Supreme Court on
appeal in law case from reviewing facts
found by jury, and Supreme Court must
sustain verdict where there is substantial
evidence to support it. Horslev v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P. 2d 592.*
On appeal in equitable proceeding, Supreme Court is permitted to review both
questions of law and fact, but that court
will give consideration to findings of trial
court and it will not disturb findings of
fact unless it appears t h a t trial judge
made findings against weight of evidence.
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 IT. 554, 190
P. 2d 135.
Where action was brought to enforce
terms of a lease and involved no equitable
issues, only errors of law could be reviewed bv Supremo Court. Jesper*cn v.
Deseret News Publishing Co., 119 I T . 235,
225 P . 2d 1050.
In an action at law, the appellate court
is powerless to substitute another evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial
court, where such evidence was conflicting.
Pixton v. Dunn, 120 U. 658, 238 P. 2d 408.
In a case in equity the Supreme Court
has responsibility to review the evidence.
Nokes v. Continental Miii. & Mill. Co., 6
IT. (2d) 177, 308 P. 2d 954.
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In equity cases the Supreme Court reviews the evidence, keeping in mind that
the trial court heard and saw the witnesses, and reverses if the court concludes
that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the decision. Barker v. Dunham,
9 U. (2d) 244, 342 P. 2d 867.
Although the question of a boundary
line by acquiescence is a matter of equity,
the Supreme Court will reverse the trial
court's findings of fact only if it concludes
that they are clearly erroneous. Nunley v.
Walker, 13 U. (2d) 105, 309 P. 2d 117.
In an equity case in which the Supreme
Court reviews the findings of fact of the
trial court, it overturns them only where
it is manifest t h a t the trial court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14
U. (2d) 36, 376 P . 2d 940.
Even though Constitution states that in
equity cases court may review facts, court
will nevertheless take into account advantaged position of trial judge. Stone v.
Stone, 19 U. (2d) 378, 431 P. 2d 802.
In proceeding to settle partnership accounts, findings that proceeds from ranch
sale were partnership assets were reviewable under this section but were not disturbed because preponderance of evidence
was not against the findings, discretion
was not abused, and injustice did not result. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 U. (2d) 378,
472 P. 2d 430.
Final judgment.
I t is a termination of a particular action
which marks the finality of the judgment,
and a decision which terminates the suit,
or puts the ease out of court without an
adjudication on the merits is nevertheless a final j u d g m e n t ; test of finality is
not whether whole matter involved in action is completed but whether the action
is terminated bv the judgment. Benson v.
Rozzelle, 85 U. 582, 39 P. 2d 1113.
Judgment dismissing action without
prejudice was a final and appealable judgment where the judgment of dismissal was
entered after a new trial had been granted,
over defendant's objection, on ground of
error in instruction. Klinge v. Southern
Pac. Co., 89 IT. 284, 57 1\ 2d 367, 105
A. L. R. 204.
Judgment denying rescission but construing contract to mean that defendant
was liable under certain conditions was
a conclusion of law in so far as appeal
was concerned and was a final decree.
Minersville "Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. Rocky
Ford Irr. Co., 90 V. 283, 61 P. 2d 605.
The question of whether an order of
dismissal is a final and appealable judg-

ment which involves the jurisdiction o:
the Supreme Court is a matter the cour
will itself notice, though not called to it;
attention bv either partv. Shurtz v. Thor
ley, 90 U. 381, 61 P. 2d 1262.
A final judgment is an adjudication tha
disposes of the case as to all the parties
and which finally disposes of the subjec
matter of the litigation on the merits o
the case. Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 6
P. 2d 1262.
The decisions of a district court ii
cases brought before it from either j u s t i c
of the peace courts or a city court an
final decisions within meaning of thi-s sec
tion. State v. Johnson, 100 U. 316, l b
P. 2d 1034, distinguished in 115 U. 394
205 P . 2d 247, 250.
In action to determine and quiet right
in waters from a lake and its tributarie
and to enjoin winter-flooding of lands
order denying petition of defendants ti
have court call in state engineer and b
proceed to hear the action as a statutory
adjudication was a final judgment fron
which an appeal could be taken. Salt Lak<
City v. Anderson, 106 IT. 350, 148 P . 2<
346.
Where an order granting defendant'
motion for a new trial merely set aside th<
jury verdict and placed the parties in tin
same position as they had been prior ti
trial, such order was not a final judgmen
from which an appeal could be taken, anc
complaining plaintiff's proper recourse wa
either a petition for interlocutory appea
under Rule 72 (b), Rules of Civil Pro
cedure, or preservation of the claime<
error for review upon final judgment
Haslan v. Paulsen, 15 U. <'2d^ 185, 38!
P. 2d 736.
Mandamus to compel district court to ac
in case appealed from justice or cit:
court.
Where district court dismissed appea
from justice's court wrongfully or withou
cause, remedy was by writ of mandati
to require district court to vacate orde
of dismissal, reinstate appeal, and procee<
to hear cause on its merits. Hoffman v
Lewis, 31 U. 179, 87 P. 167.
While if district court passes upoi
merits of case appealed to it from justice
court, its errors, however gross, canno
be reviewed by Supreme Court, becaus
district court is the court of last resor
on such appeals, still if district court
without sufficient or any legal reason, re
fuses to dispose of the appeal upon tin
merits, Supreme Court must require tha
court to hear and determine the same upoi
its merits, and make findings and con
elusions of law in accordance with tit
evidence as it finds it to be, and ente
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judgment accordingly. Salt Lake Coffee
& Spice Co. v. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 44 U. 411, 140 P. 6C6.
Mandamus to reinstate appeal was
proper remedy where appeal was dismissed
on ground that district court was without
jurisdiction as matter of law when court
in fact had jurisdiction of appeal. Hanson
v. Iverson, District Court Judge, 61 U.
172, 211 P. 682.
Motion for new trial.
A judgment becomes final, for purpose
of appeal, when the motion for a new trial
is overruled, and effect of a motion for a
new trial, when seasonably made, is to
suspend the judgment or decree for purposes of appeal until the motion has been
disposed of. Petersen v. Ohio Copper Co.,
71 U. 444, 266 P. 1050.
Where no motion was made for directed
verdict or new trial, the Supreme Court
was precluded from reviewing sufficiency
of evidence in action at law, since under
this section appeal may be made only on
questions of law. Brigham v. Moon Lake
Electric Assn., 24 U. (2d) 292, 470 P . 2d
893.
Water Conservancy Act.
This constitutional provision applies
only to appeals from final judgments of

ART. VIII, § 10

district courts, not from district boards
such as created by the Water Conservancy
Act. But t h a t act, in so far as it attempted
to abrogate right of appeal from final
judgments of court allowing or dismissing
petition for organization of district, violated this section. (73-9-1 et seq.) Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist.,
106 U. 55, 145 P . 2d 503.
Collateral References.
Appeal and Error€=>4; Courts<S=>190.
4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 18-22.
4 Am. J u r . 2d 532, 535, Appeal and
Error §§ 1, 4.
Moot questions: when criminal case becomes moot so as to preclude review of or
attack on conviction or sentence, 9 A.
L. R. 3d 462.
Plea of guilty in justice of peace court
as precluding appeal, 42 A. L. R. 2d 995.
Reviewability, on appeal from final
judgment of justice of the peace resulting in trial de novo, of interlocutory
order, as affected by fact that order was
separately appealable, 79 A. L. R. 2d 1367.
Law Review.
Proposals for Truce In The Holy W a r :
Utah Adoption, Richard I. Aaron, 1970
Utah L. Rev. 325.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Review of facts in equity cases.
Since action to recover money claimed
to be owing on contract, wherein foreclosure of mortgage or other lien to secure
payment thereof was also sought, was case
in equity and jury's decision therein was

only advisory to trial court, by virtue of
Code 1943, 104-23-5, as amended by Laws
1945, ch. 25, this constitutional provision
required t h a t facts in such case be reviewed by Supreme^Court on appeal. P e t t y
v
« Clark, 113 U. 205, 192 P. 2d 589.

Sec. 10. [County attorneys—Election, terms, appointment pro tempore.]
A county attorney shall be elected by the qualified voters of each
county who shall hold his office for a term of four years. The powers
and duties of county attorneys, and such other attorneys for the state
as the legislature may provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all cases
where the attorney for any county, or for the state, fails or refuses to
attend and prosecute according' to law, the court shall have power to appoint an attorney pro tempore. (As amended November 5, 1946, effective
January 1, 1947.)
Cross-Reference.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1945 amendment was proposed by
House Joint Resolution No. 4, Laws 1945,
p. 321, and was adopted at the general
election on November 5, 1940, and became
effective January 1, 1947. The amendment
increased the term of county attorneys
from two to four years.

Statutory provisions, 17-18-1 et seq.
Construction, operation and effect.
The 1947 amendment to 17-10-6, providing that county attorneys be elected at
general election held in November, 1950
and every four years thereafter, and t h a t
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erected without knowledge and consent of
owner thereof, or mechanic's lien holders, does
not relieve building in its new location from
liability of a deficiency existing on the sale of
the land on which the building was erected to
satisfy such hens Sanford v Kunkel, 30 Utah
379, 85 P 363, 85 P 1012 (1906)
S c o p e and e x t e n t of lien g e n e r a l l y .
Necessary appurtenances, including easements which extend outside of boundaries of
land upon which building is erected, is covered

by provisions of this section Park City Meat
Co v Comstock Silver Mining C o , 36 Utah
145, 103 P 254 (1909)
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien.
Where there is substantial compliance with
statute creating lien, and hen has in fact been
established, hen so established cannot be defeated by technicalities nor by nice distinctions Park City Meat Co v Comstock Silver
Mining C o , 36 Utah 145, 103 P 254 (1909)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am J u r 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 39
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 20
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or ma-

t e n a l for separate buildings of one owner, 15
A L R 3d 73
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=> 22

38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for
the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time
when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.
History: R.S 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1384,
1835; C.L. 1917, §§ 3734, 3735; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-5.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Priority of lessor's
hen, § 38-3-2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAIASIS

Commencement and duration of hen
"Commencement to do work "
Estoppel
Extent of hen
Notice to hen holders
Priority over other hens and claims
Purchase money mortgage
Questions of law and fact
Real estate mortgage
Recordation and notice
Relation back
Subdivision development
Cited
C o m m e n c e m e n t a n d d u r a t i o n of lien.
This section expressly provides that hens
shall attach at the time the performance of the
contract commences, accordingly claimant's
hen attaches on the date he commences the

work or furnishes the material, and is not postponed to the date of filing the notice for record
Morrison v Carey-Lombard Co , 9 Utah 70, 33
P 238 (1893)
Mechanic's hen takes effect as of the date of
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commencement of work and furnishing of materials, and is prior to intervening equities.
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, 85
P. 1012 (1906).
When labor and materials are furnished to
one not an owner, lien attaches to title instant
title vests in owner so contracting for labor and
materials furnished before he became the
owner. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Mid vale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44
P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46
P.2d 672 (1935).
Whether the subsequent furnishings of materials is part of one continuous transaction, in
which case the priority date of the lien would
relate back to the first delivery date, or
whether such furnishings constitute separate
contracts, in which case there would be no relation back, is a question of fact. Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977).
"Commencement to do work."
The phrase "commencement to do work," as
used in this section, is construed in favor of
lien claimants. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson,
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
Estoppel.
A person furnishing materials may be estopped by his or its acts and conduct from enjoying the priority accorded by this section.
Spargo v. Nelson, 10 Utah 274, 37 P. 495
(1894).
Extent of lien.
While mortgagee who advances money to
mortgagor to construct a building has lien
prior to that of a subcontractor performing
labor and furnishing materials for such building, such lien extends only to amount actually
advanced on mortgage. Culmer Paint & Glass
Co. v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66 (1913).
Notice to lien holders.
This section requires other lien holders, by
mortgage or otherwise, to take notice of the
commencement of work on the building.
Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 764
(1890).
Survey of property did not meet the notice
standard contemplated by this section where
the survey stakes were not sufficiently noticeable or related to actual construction to impart
notice to a prudent lender. Tripp v. Vaughn,
747 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Priority over other liens and claims.
A deed of trust upon a canal to be constructed cannot take precedence over a mechanic's lien for work done and materials furnished in building the canal, although trust
deed antedates the doing of the work or furnishing the materials. Canal is not in existence
until constructed. Garland v. Bear Lake &
River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah
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350, 34 P. 368 (1893), afTd, 164 U.S. 1,17 S. Ct.
7, 41 L. Ed. 327 (1896).
Lien for all of materials furnished by single
lien claimant on continuous, open, running account, for purpose of developing and operating
mine, held prior to trust deed executed by mining company and recorded between times when
materials are first and last furnished. Fields v.
Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528
(1902); Salt Lake Hdwe. Co. v. Fields, 69 P.
1134 (1902) (not officially reported).
Where vendees of land contracts on property
involved jointly assigned errors in mortgage
foreclosure action on cross-appeal, their liens
are postponed to date of last vendee's contract,
and claims of lien claimants attach as of date
when first materials are furnished and first
labor performed; and claim of lien claimants is
held superior to claim of such vendees in foreclosure action. United States Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah
506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah
522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935).
Lien for labor and materials supplied purchaser of lot for building constructed thereon is
inferior to interest of vendor of the lot and his
successor, where it is not shown that vendor or
his successor consent to, ratify, or authorize
the furnishing of the materials and labor. Burton Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah
92, 66 P.2d 134 (1937).
In determining priorities between construction mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mortgage for definite amount recorded prior to attachment of any lien takes priority up to the
amount actually paid over any mechanic's
liens attaching subsequent to recording of
mortgage, although loan which mortgage is intended to secure is paid over to borrower as
needed and never advanced in full. Western
Mtg. Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967).
Purchase money mortgage.
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a purchase money mortgage given at time of purchase of property in question where mortgagee,
after materials are furnished, releases original
mortgage and takes new mortgage, which
transaction, however, is not in renewal of old
mortgage, but is done to obtain increased security on old debt. But after satisfaction of lien,
mortgagee is entitled to surplus. Badger Coal
& Lumber Co. v. Olsen, 50 Utah 307, 167 P.
680 (1917).
Purchase money mortgage had priority over
a mechanics' lien where the mechanics' lien did
not attach until after the mortgage was recorded. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d
922 (Utah 1982).
Questions of law and fact.
In action involving priority between mortgages and mechanic's lien, whether all mate-
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rials furnished during certain period are furnished under one contract or under different
contracts is question of fact Gwilham Lumber
& Coal Co v El Monte Springs Corp , 87 Utah
134, 48 P2d 463 (1935)
Real estate mortgage.
A mortgagee who loans money to a mortgagor-borrower generally is not only entitled
but obliged to pay out the money in accordance
with the directions of the borrower, however, if
the mortgagee knows that the monev is being
borrowed for the purpose of creating improvements and that materials are being furnished
under such circumstances that the mortgagee
should know that materialmen are relying on
being paid from such funds, and if the mortgagee knows that the money is being diverted
into other purposes, then under such circumstances the mortgagee is not accorded priority
as to those funds advanced after a materialman starts delivering building supplies Utah
Sav & Loan Ass'n v Mecham, 11 Utah 2d 159,
356 P2d 281 (1960)
A mortgagee may be estopped from claiming
a priority over a mechanic's hen, however, in
order to establish an estoppel, the lien claimant must show some concealment, misrepresentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee
upon which the hen holder properly relies and
by which he is induced to act differently than
he would otherwise act Utah Sav & Loan
Ass'n v Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d
598, 15 A L R 3d 63 (1961)
Recordation and notice.
From the time the contractor begins to furnish materials, it is notice to anyone thereafter
contracting with the owner that the property is
burdened with a lien, and no previous notice is
required, and by the terms of this section, the
hen relates back to the time of furnishing the
materials Car> -Lombard Lumber Co v
Sheets 10 Utah 322 37 P 572 (1894)
Materialmen furnishing an occupying claimant of real estate, material for impro\ements
theron with record notice of a prior mortgage
on the premises, have no lien against the true
owner thereof particularly where occupying
claimant's claims to property are based upon
fraud and lack of good faith Doyle v West
Temple Terrace Co , 47 Utah 238, 152 P 1180
(1915)

Relation back.
Mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing
of materials and labor, both on the overall 44acre site and on individual condominium units
within the development, related back to the
initial work done on the project First of
Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel &
Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979)
The priority of all mechanic's hens arising
from a project is determined by the date of commencement of work on the project site or furnishing materials on the site and the release of
his claims and hens by the lien holder who so
commenced work or initially furnished materials does not affect the priority of other hens
First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel
& Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979)
For one contractor's hen to relate back to the
commencement of work or supplying of materials by another contractor, both contractors'
projects must have been performed in connection with what is essentially a single project
performed under a common plan prosecuted
with reasonable promptness and without material abandonment, however, ordinary maintenance and cleanup work does not constitute a
sufficient basis to permit "tacking" in order to
fix an earlier hen date under this section for
labor and materials supplied Calder Bros Co
v Anderson, 652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982)
The right to have a mechanic's hen relate
back to the commencement of work is not defeated merely because the owners did not employ a general contractor but, instead, contracted individually with various subcontractors Duckett v Olsen, 699 P 2d 734 (Utah
1985)
Subdivision development.
Work of la\ing out and developing subdivision including engineering, installing water
mains sewer mams and laterals, curbs and
gutters, surfacing streets* and other off-site
construction does not gi\e rise to mechanic's
lien attaching to particular home being constructed within subdi\ision Western Mtg
Loan Corp v Cottonwood Constr Co , 18 Utah
2d 409, 424 P 2d 437 (1967)
Cited in Knight v Post, 748 P 2d 1097 (Ct
App 1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanics'
Liens * 263
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 197
A.L.R. — Mechanic's hen based on contract

with vendor pending executory contract for
sale of property as affecting purchaser's interest, 50 A L R 3 d 944
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 198
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one piece of property belonging to the same
owner without designating the amount due on
each building or improvement, he may enforce
the lien against the owner; however, if there
are other lien claimants of the same class, his
claim is subordinate to theirs if the claims of
the latter are against only one of the buildings
or if they complied with this section. Utah Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366
P.2d 598, 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961).

erty, is properly admitted in evidence Garfier
v. Van Patten/20 Utah 342, 58 P. 684 (1809).
Where labor is performed or materials furnished upon several buildings owned by the
same person or persons, a claimant may include in one claim all amounts due and the
claim will not be defective if the amount due on
each separate building is not designated. Utah
Sav & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335,
366 P.2d 598, 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961).
If a claimant files a lien against more than

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15
A.L.R.3d 73.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=»
130(1).

Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 185.
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 134.
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or tfia-

38-1-9. Notice imparted by record.
{\) The recorder must record the c\aim in an index maintained for that
purpose.
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons are considered to
have notice of the claim.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1389;
C.L. 1917, § 3739; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-9; L. 1987, ch. 50, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided this section into subsections, substituted "an index maintained for that purpose" for "a book kept by him for that purpose,
and" at the end of Subsection (1); and substi-

tuted "the claim is filed" for "of the filing
thereof" and "are considered to have notice of
the claim" for "shall be deemed to have notice
thereof and made a capitalization and punctuation change in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. — Record as imparting
notice, k 57-3-2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 186

C.J.S. —57 C.J.S Mechanics' Liens § 131.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 159

38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing
regardless of time of filing.
The \\£T\s for VJOYVL ai\d l^box &vv& orra&teY\&lfuraisk^d as provided ra tt\\s
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor
or furnishing such material.
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-10.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Relation back.
The priority of all mechanic's hens arising
from a project is determined by the date of commencement of work on the project site or furnishmg materials on the site and the release of

his claims and hens by the hen holder who so
commenced work or initially furnished materials does not affect the priority of other hens
First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel
& Assocs , 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)

38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action
for debt not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun within
twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension
of work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within the twelve months
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of
the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to
possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of
the commencement of the action, and the burden of proof shall be upon the
lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right of
any person to whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the same.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1390,
1395; C.L. 1917, §§ 3740, 3745; L. 1931, ch. 5,
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 52-1-11.

Cross-References. — Justices' courts jurisdiction to foreclose hen, § 78-5-2
Lis pendens generally, § 78-40-2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Another action pending
Burden of proof
Effect of untimely action
Execution
Extension of time for filing notice
Findings and conclusions of law
Lis pendens
Nature of proceeding
Parties
Pleadings and proceedings
Waiver and estoppel
What law governs
Cited
Another action pending.
Action in equity to foreclose mechanic's hen
is not barred by pnoi suit at law to recover for
materials sold and delivered State ex rel
Dorsett v Morse, 36 Utah 362, 103 P 969
I (1909).
Burden of proof.
Burden of proof is on claimant to show that
he is entitled to the hen and has complied with

the statute Hathaway v United Tmtic Mines
Co, 42 Utah 520, 132 P 388 (1913),
Greenhalgh v United Tmtic Mines Co, 42
Utah 524, 132 P 390 (1913)
Effect of untimely action.
An untimely action under this section is jurisdictional and forecloses the rights of the parties It is not subject to waiver and estoppel as
are procedural statutes of limitations AAA
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waives, releases, and discharges any hen or
right to lien that materialman might have or
thereafter acquire against real property, such
provision does not apply to any future hen
right which materialman might acquire Such
release relates only to the particular debt paid
and receipted for in the particular transaction
Claims of materialman for mechanics' hens for
remainder due are valid entitling it to assert
and foreclose such hens Bnmwood Homes, Inc

v Knudsen Bldrs Supply Co , 14 Utah 2d 419,
385 P 2d 982 (1963)
Where claims of materialman for mechanics'
hens are valid, he is entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee under § 38-1-18 where penalty
provided by this section for alleged failure of
materialman to release hens is sought by
builder who contends that the hens are invalid
Bnmwood Homes, Inc v Knudsen Bldrs Supply Co , 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P 2d 982 (1963)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 246
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «= 242

38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty.
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for record a claim of lien
against any property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due
him, with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the owner or person
liable by means of such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, or to
procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1399;
C.L. 1917, § 3749; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-25.

38-1-26. Assignment of lien.
All hens under this chapter shall be assignable as other choses in action,
and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own
name in the manner herein provided.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1396;
C.L. 1917, § 3746; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-26.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to perfect lien.
Under this section, right to perfect a lien is

assignable Smoot v Checketts, 41 Utah 211,
125 P 412, 1915C Ann Cas 1113 Q912)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 284

C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens *? 216 et
seq
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 202
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mg to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use
of such words as herein provided In all cases the interest of joint tenants must
be equal and undivided
History: R.S 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973, C L.
1917, § 4873, R S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L.
1953, ch. 93, § 1.

Cross-References. — Inheritance tax on
jointly held property § 59-12-5
Interparty agreements, § 15-3-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint tenancies
—Alienation and execution
—Judicial sales
—Severance by conveyance or sale
Preference for tenancy in common
Joint tenancies.
-Alienation and execution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
said that it would assume that "Utah accepts
the general common-law rules relating to joint
tenancies, including the rules permitting
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant and
,
,
, . i
.
,
making its property subject to execution and
senarate sale " Manzus v Miller 317 U S 178

of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to
*? for <*» benefit of all cotenants Jolley v
Corr
y' 6 7 1 P 2d 139 ( U t a h 1983)
_ s e v e r a n c e b y conveyance or sale.
„ severed b
The mle that a
t te
one
tenant,s
h e s n o t o n l to v o l .
.
, . , .
, .
untary conveyances, but also to involuntary
J
J
' x
, , ,
T n
conveyances pursuant to judicial sales Jolley

?3PS Ct 182 8?L Ed 1 8 ^ 5 ^

v Co

317 U S 712, 63 S Ct 432 87 L Ed 567
(1943)
—Judicial sales
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga

Preference for tenancy in common.
This section expresses the trend away from
the English joint tenancy and in favor of tenancy in common Neill v Royce, 101 Utah 181,

tion to a mortgagee her subsequent purchase

120 P 2d 327 (1941)

^>

6 7 1 P 2d 139 ( U t a h 1 9 8 3

>

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am Jur. 2d — 20 Am Jur 2d Cotenancy
and Joint Ownership § 27
C.J.S. — 86 C J S Tenanc\ in Common § 7
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint

tenancy by conveyance of divided interest directlv to self 7 A L R 4th 1268
Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common «=» 3

57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation
and effect — Interest of person not named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs,
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have
had actual notice Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein
386
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provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the interest of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1975;
C.L. 1917, § 4875; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, § 1; 1947, ch. 97, § 1.
Cross-References. — Acknowledgments
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq.
Certified copies of record of conveyance, admission in evidence, § 78-25-13.

County recorder, § 17-21-1 et seq.
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3.
Judgments, record of as imparting notice,
§ 17-21-11.
Recording generally, § 57-3-1 et seq.
Transmitting documents by telegraph or
telephone, § 69-1-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acknowledgments.
Actual notice.
—Assignments.
—Duty to inquire.
—Execution sales.
—Occupancy and possession.
—Trusts.
Delivery of deed.
Effect of failure to record.
Equitable rights.
Livery of seizin
Mortgages.
Patents.
Priorities.
Recital of consideration.
Recordation as notice.
—In general.
—Forged deed.
"Recorded" construed.
Acknowledgments.
A deed as between the parties and those having notice thereof is good without any acknowledgment, and actual possession constitutes notice. Jordan v. Utah R.R., 47 Utah 519, 156 P.
939 (1916)
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid
between the parties thereto. Mitchell v.
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P.2d 970 (1952).
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee himself as notary public is void; thus, a mortgage,
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though recorded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since
it is not legally recordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). See § 57-2-1 et seq.

Actual notice.
—Assignments.
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in
position to object that statutory notice of assignment was not given. Snyder v. Murdock,
20 Utah 407, 59 P. 88 (1899 >.
—Duty to inquire.
The demands of this section are answered if
a party dealing with the land has information
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge of the state of the title; this is
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actual notice. Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24
P. 190 (1890), affd, 154 U.S. 499, 14 S. Ct.
1144, 38 L. Ed. 1062 (1894), distinguished,
Shafer v. Killpack, 53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948
(1918).
The "actual notice" required by this section
is satisfied if a party dealing with the land had
information of facts which would put a prudent
man upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would
lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the
title; actual notice is a question of fact. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983).
—Execution sales.
Where vendee purchased realty from one
who had bought it at an execution sale and the
record shows the consideration given at the
sale was grossly inadequate, the levy excessive
and no return made by the sheriff of any attempt to levy on personal property, the vendee
would not be justified in failing to make a reasonable inquiry into the validity of the sale
and if he did not make such inquiry, he would
not be a bona fide purchaser for value. Pender
v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 42
A.L.R.2d 1078 (1954).
—Occupancy and possession.
Even though auditor's tax deed and county
tax deed were not acknowledged, title technically need not pass to protect a tax title claimant, and also the deed is binding as to defendant who had actual notice because of the
claimant's occupancy of the property. Peterson
v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814
(1957), affd, 8 Utah 2d 348, 334 P.2d 759
(1959).
Actual occupancy is enough to put parties
dealing with the premises upon inquiry.
Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890),
affd, 154 U.S. 499, 14 S. Ct. 1144, 38 L. Ed.
1062 (1894). distinguished, Shafer v. Killpack
53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948 (1918).
Under this section actual possession and occupancy amounts to "actual notice" to all the
world of grantee's rights even if his deed is not
recorded. Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P. 573 (1894).
—Trusts.
Trustee under a deed of trust did not have
actual notice of plaintiffs predecessors' interest in the grazing land subject to the deed of
trust where, at the time the deed of trust was
executed and recorded, there were no cattle
grazing on the land, no one living on the land,
and no other evidence of any activity on the
property which would have reasonably alerted
the trustee to the claims of plaintiffs' predecessors and which would have required further
investigation. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308
(Utah 1983).
Delivery of deed.
Deed duly executed and acknowledged and

shown to be in possession of grantee is sel
proving both as to execution and delivery, an
recording of deed is likewise evidence of deli'
ery. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, i
P.2d 355 (1934).
Inference of delivery arising from possessic
of deed by grantee and from recording there
is entitled to great and controlling weight ai
can only be overcome by clear and convincii
evidence. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 42
29 P.2d 355 (1934).
Where duly acknowledged and recorded de
was found among papers of deceased grant<
inference of delivery and execution at abc
date stated in deed arose, and burden was up
those claiming nondelivery to show such fa
Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P.2d 4
(1934).
In action by administrator of grantor agai
executor of grantee, finding of nondelivery
deed, found among effects of grantee, duly
knowledged, and recorded three days ai
death of grantor, was sustained by evider
Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P.2d (1934).
Assuming valid delivery of warranty dee<
grandson of grantor, such deed would not j
vail over right to property existing in t\
person who had previously acquired deed fi
grantor, but who had not recorded same u
after deed to grandson, where it appeared 1
land was in possession of occupant as ]
chaser from, and, after default, as tenan
third person. Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah
91 P.2d 454 (1939).
Effect of failure to record.
Where, after mortgage was executed on
tain tract of land, owner executed dee<
grantee on property not included in mortg
which deed was not recorded, decree in ac
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, in<
ing part conveyed to grantee, was not bin
on grantee who was not party to such ac
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 15<
P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935).
Recordation is not a prerequisite to th<
lidity of a deed; although unrecorded, deec
binding on the parties thereto. Gregers<
Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983).
Equitable rights.
This section itself gives no equities; e
applies this section in determining eqi
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156
48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935).
Livery of seizin.
In Utah, livery of seizin is unknown. N<
ute has expressly abolished it, but by us
is dispensed with. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. £
2 Utah 39 (1877), affd, 104 U.S. 428, 26
802 (1881).

388

CONVEYANCES

This section applies to mortgages. Priorities
between successive mortgages, however, are
-Lerned by general principles of mortgage
uw State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 572, 268 P. 561
(19281
patents.
Record showing that patent was duly executed and verified as provided by law is admislible. Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003
[1909).
priorities.
Where contract vendor, notwithstanding
that there was still balance due on purchase
jrice, executed warranty deed in trust, for protection of purchaser and to secure loan, and
fnade assignment of his interest with knowledge and consent of trustee and vendee, and
subsequently creditor of vendor recovered judgment against him, and after sheriffs sale sold
lis interest to bank which recorded deed prior
JO assignment, bank was entitled to priority as
igainst assignee. Huffaker v. First Nat'l Bank,
\2 Utah 317, 173 P. 903 (1918).
lecital of consideration.
This section does not provide that a nominal
onsideration is not such a circumstance as to
>lace a third person on notice of any outstandng interests but rather that the recital of a
tominal consideration in a deed or other re-
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corded instrument shall not have that effect. It
is a well-known fact that often a conveyance
recites a nominal consideration whereas the
true consideration is not nominal. It is therefore never certain that the recited consideration is the true consideration. This is not the
case in an execution sale. In such a sale there
can be no doubt in the mind of the purchaser as
to what was the actual consideration. Pender v.
Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 42
A.L.R.2d 1078 (1954).
Recordation as notice.
—In general.
One who deals with real property is charged
with notice of what is shown by the records of
the county recorder of the county in which the
property is situated. Crompton v. Jenson, 78
Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).
—Forged deed.
The recording of a forged deed gives no notice as to its contents and a bona fide purchaser
from the person who forged the deed takes
nothing. Rasmussen v. OJsen, 583 P.2d 50
(Utah 1978).
"Recorded" construed.
There is nothing in this section which specifically defines what is meant by the word "recorded." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Inv.
Co., 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and
Recording Laws § 47 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 74; 92 C.J.S.
Vendor and Purchaser § 325.
A.L.R. — Failure of vendor to comply with
tatute or ordinance requiring approval or reording of plat prior to conveyance of property
s rendering sale void or voidable, 77 A.L.R.3d
058.

Recorded real property instrument as charging third party with constructive notice of provisions of extrinsic instrument referred to
therein, 89 A.L.R.3d 901.
Key Numbers. — Deeds «=» 82; Vendor and
Purchaser <*= 227.

>7-l-7. Applicability of chapter.
This act shall apply to all instruments, whether recorded prior to or subse[uent to the effective date hereof, but as to instruments which have been
ecorded prior thereto, it shall not apply until one year from its effective date.
History: L. 1945, ch. 106, § 2; 1947, ch. 97, this section, while the latter act (L. 1947, ch.
2; C. 1943, Supp., 78-1-6.10.
92) amended both § 57-1-6 and this section.
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "This
Meaning of "effective date hereof." —
ct" appearing at the beginning of this section The phrase "effective date hereof appearing in
ppeared in this section both as enacted by L. this section appeared in this section both as
945, ch. 106, § 2 and as amended (without enacted by L. 1945, ch. 106, § 2 and as
lange) by L. 1947, ch. 97, § 2 and appears to amended by L. 1947, ch. 97, § 2. The effective
& referring to those acts. The former act (L. dates of L. 1945, ch. 106 and L. 1947, ch. 97 are
^45, ch. 106) amended § 57-1-6 and enacted May 8, 1945 and May 13, 1947, respectively.
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party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, the clerk, upon
reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs and tax
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party.
The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the Court of Appeals
upon the request of either party made within five days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the
state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with
the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.

Rule 35. Petition for rehearing.
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A
matter may not be reheard by the court en banc. A petition for rehearing may
be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the entry of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. The
petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner so desires.
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless requested by the court.
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by
Rule 27(a), and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26(b).
Except by permission and order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any
response requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.

Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur.
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after
the entry of the judgment, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A
certified copy of the opinion of the court, any direction as to costs, and the
record of the proceedings shall constitute the remittitur.
(b) Stay of remittitur pending rehearing petition. The timely filing of a
petition for rehearing will stay the remittitur until disposition of the petition,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the petition is denied, the remittitur
shall issue immediately after entry of the order denying the petition, unless
the court otherwise orders.
(c) Stay, supersedeas, or injunction pending application for review to
Supreme Court of Utah and Supreme Court of United States. A stay or
supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review
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ADDENDUM C: Opinion of Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
General Glass Corporation, a
Colorado corporation,
OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff,
v.
Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation, Ron Mast as assignee
of the rights of Intermountain Glass
and Paint Company, a Utah corporation.
United Pacific Reliance Insurance
Company, a Washington corporation,
and Oakhills Condominium Limited
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership,
Defendants and Appellants.
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company,
a Utah corporation,
Crossclaim Plaintiff and Appellant,

Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation. United Pacific Reliance
Insurance Company, a Washington
corporation, and Oakhills Condominium
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited
partnership,
Crossclaim Defendants
and Appellant.

I

Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company,
a Utah corporation.
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.

Case No. 860355-CA

FILED
Tirr ilhy ,A Snoa
<{< o' the Court
Utah Court of Appeels

State Savings & Loan Association;
Utah State Tax Commission; Robert P.
Hansen; Capitol Glass & Aluminum;
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Debenham Electrical Supply Co,:
Electro Tech Corporation: Ron Mast as
assignee of the rights of Marathon Steel
Company; Edwards & Daniels Associates;
and John Brown & Associates; and John
and Jane Does 1 thru 100,
Third-party Defendants and
Appellants.
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Marathon Steel Company,
an Arizona corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation; Oakhills Condominium
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited
partnership; and United Pacific
Reliance Insurance Company,
a Washington corporation,
Defendants and Appellant.
Mast Construction Company, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Pacific Western Industries, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, Oakhills
Condominium Limited Partnership,
a Utah limited partnership, and
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc.,
Third-party Defendants.
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American Savings & Loan Association,
a California corporation, formerly
State Savings and Loan Association,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Oakhills Partnership, a Utah limited
partnership; Pacific Western of Utah,
Inc., a Utah corporation, formerly
Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Charles W. Akerlow; Richard
J. Anderson; State Tax Commission of
Utah, Robert P. Hansen; Capital Glass
and Aluminum Corporation, a Utah
corporation; Ron Mast as assignee of the
rights of Debenham Electric Supply
Company, Inc., an Alaska corporation;
Electro Technical Corp., a Utah
corporation: Ron Mast as assignee of
the rights of Intermountain Glass &
Paint Co., a Utah corporation; General
Glass Corp., a Colorado corporation;
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Marathon Steel Co., an Arizona
corporation; Edwards & Daniels
Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation;
Ogden's Carpet Outlet, a Utah
corporation; Mast Construction Co., a
Utah corporation; Mildred S. Freymuller;
and John Does 1 thru 30,
Defendants and Appellants.
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Debenham Electric Supply Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Electro Technical Corporation,
Mast Construction Company, the
Oakhills Partnership, and
United Pacific Insurance Company,
Defendants and Appellants.
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Before Judges Davidson, Bench and Jackson.

DAVIDSON, Judge:
American Savings and Loan Association (American) loaned
funds to the Oakhills Partnership (Oakhills) for the
construction of Oakhills Condominiums. Oakhills, a Utah
limited partnership, had Pacific Western Industries, Inc.
(Pacific Western), a Utah corporation, as the general partner.
Charles W. Akerlow (Akerlow) and Richard J, Anderson (Anderson)
were, respectively, chairman of the board and president of
Pacific Western.
The March 28, 1983, loan from American to Oakhills was
secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust. Akerlow and
Anderson signed the deed of trust but the loan amount, date of
the note, identity of the trustee, and the seal of Pacific
Western were omitted. The deed of trust was recorded with the
Salt Lake County Recorder on April 8, 1983. It was rerecorded
on April 20, 1983. The date and the amount of the note were
added at that time. An "X" was placed over the initial
recording with a line-out placed on the book and page numbers
of that recording. On April 26, 1983, Western States Title
Company (Western States) was added to the deed of trust as
trustee and the April 20th recording was crossed out in the
same manner. At trial, Akerlow testified the deed of trust,
M
as completely filled in," conformed to "the terms of [the]
deal" with American.
Jeffrey J. Jensen (Jensen), vice president of Western
States, acknowledged the deed of trust in his capacity as a
notary public. He testified that he could not "remember
specifically" whether Akerlow and Anderson were present when he
acknowledged their signatures. Neither could Jensen state
whether the two officers of Pacific Western were placed under
oath "as to their corporate authority." Jensen did testify
that it was his "customary practice" to have the parties sign
documents "at the time of closing" and he would acknowledge
them. It was not his practice to place them under oath.
Additionally, Jensen testified to his personal knowledge of
Akerlow and Anderson.
A representative of American testified that Jensen,
Akerlow, and Anderson were present at the closing. He also
testified Ronald E. Mast, president of Mast Construction
Company, the general contractor, was present for a portion of
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the closing. The representative could not remember exactly how
the closing was conducted. Ron Mast denied he was present at
the closing, that he had ever seen American's representative
prior to the trial, and that he had ever been Hto the business"
of Western States.
Ron Mast claimed work began on Oakhills Condominiums
prior to April 8, 1983, the date of the initial recording of
the deed of trust by American. However, the notice of lien
recorded by Mast Construction Company indicated April 28, 1983,
as the date the Hfirst labor, material and equipment was
performed.H In an answer to an interrogatory, Ron Mast listed
April 18, 1983, as the date on which "work was commenced, or
materials were furnished on the ground for the structure, or
improvement constructed on the property.* Roger J. Mast, vice
president of Mast Construction Company, was questioned at trial
about his deposition. There, he answered that he "started the
job- on April 18, 1983.
W. David Hammons (Hammons), president of Electro
Technical Corporation (Electro Tech) and a subcontractor on
Oakhills Condominiums, filed a notice of lien which indicated
May 6, 1983, as the da£e Electro Tech commenced work. However,
Hammons testified at trial a temporary power panel and pole, a
coil of wire, and some conduit were placed at the building site
on April 6, 1983. Mast Construction Company relies on Electro
Tech's placement of electrical equipment at the site to
establish the priority of its lien over American's deed of
trust.
Another lienholder filed a complaint on March 14, 1985,
to foreclose its lien on Oakhills Condominiums. Other similar
actions were consolidated with the result that Mast
Construction Company and Ron Mast are appellants and American
the respondent.1 On June 19, 1986, the trial court granted
American partial summary judgment which stated the deed of
trust at issue, as recorded on April 8, 1983, was operative as
either a deed of trust or mortgage. The court reserved the
propriety of the signatures' acknowledgment and the date work
commenced on Oakhills Condominiums for the bench trial which
was held on July 25 and 26, 1986. An order for entry of final
judgment was filed on November 18, 1986, which declared
American's deed of trust was a valid lien against Oakhills
Condominiums and had priority over all other liens against that
project. The trial court directed the entry of judgment as
final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
1. Other lien claimants have assigned their claims to Ron Mast
resulting in his being an appellant personally as well as
president of Mast Construction Company, the other appellant.
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Appellants present two issues for review; (1) was the
recording of the deed of trust as it appeared on April 8# 1983/
effective in view of the omissions thereon and that the
signators were not placed under oath; and (2) did the placement
of the electrical equipment at the building site of Oakhills
Condominiums on April 6, 1983, constitute commencement to do
work for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974)?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that findings of fact
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses." However, we accord
the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference,
but review them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
THE DEED OF TRUST
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986) states:
Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth
an agreement to convey any real estate or
whereby any real estate may be affected,
to operate as notice to third persons
shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this
title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real
estate is situated, but shall be valid and
binding between the parties thereto
without such proofs, acknowledgment,
certification or record, and as to all
other persons who have had actual notice
(emphasis added).
The "actual notice" exception to the requirement that a
conveyance or instrument be validly recorded to impart notice
to third persons is discussed in Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308
(Utah 1983). There the Utah Supreme Court stated actual notice
was a question of fact. The Court wrote:
This statute was under examination by this
Court in Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24
P. 190 (1890), where we held that the
"actual notice" required by § 57-1-6 was
satisfied if a party dealing with the land
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had information of facts which would put a
prudent man upon inquiry and which/ if
pursued/ would lead to actual knowledge as
to the state of the title. See a similar
expression in McGarry v. Thompson, 114
Utah 442/ 201 P.2d 288 (1948).
Id. at 310.
1987).

Accord Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App.

In the instant case it is not necessary to address the "duty
to inquireH prong of actual notice. The record on appeal
contains numerous exhibits. American's exhibit 32/ received by
the trial court, is a letter written on March 24, 1983. In it,
American's representative at the closing sent Jensen a list of
conditions to be fulfilled prior to closing. Condition number 6
requires, MYou must have in your possession the Subordination
Agreement signed by Mast Construction Co. Inc." American's
exhibit 33, also received, is that agreement in which Mast
Construction Company subordinated to American a specific sum
until the occurrence of certain events set forth in the document.
The agreement was dated March 28, 1983, the day of closing, and
was signed by American's representative and by Ron Mast in his
capacity as president of Mast Construction Company. The legal
description of the property on the exhibit attached to the
subordination agreement is the same as that depicted on the
exhibit to the deed of trust. At trial, American's
representative testified the subordination agreement had been
executed by the time of closing because of a notation on exhibit
32 followed by his initials.
In view of the above, we find that Ron Mast had actual notice
of the deed of trust at issue prior to April 6, 1983, the date on
which he relies to establish the priority of his lien. As a
consequence of his actual notice, the deed of trust is valid and
binding as to Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company.
Because of the above, it is unnecessary to analyze whether
Hammons' placement of electrical equipment at the building site
constituted commencement to do work for the purpose of satisfying
the mechanics' lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26
(1974). The validity of the April 6, 1983 lien date is
immaterial once the priority of American's deed of trust is
established as to appellants.
The judgment of the court below that American's deed of trust
was valid and had priority over all other liens is affirmed.
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Costs against appellants.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

JACKSON, Judge:

(Concurring in result only)

Without addressing* whether the April 8 trust deed from
Oakhills' general partner to American was legally effective to
create a lien, the majority has determined that it was "valid
and binding" on Ron Mast and his company. The majority examines
the record evidence and makes a factual finding that was not
made by the trial court, namely, that Mast had actual notice of
the April 8 trust deed. This actual notice arises solely from
the fact that, on March 28, Mast signed a subordination
agreement that clearly informed him that American was loaning
money to Oakhills for the condominium construction project on
which Mast Construction Company and other lien claimants
eventually worked. That agreement, however, does not mention
anything about an existing or planned trust deed on the project
site from Oakhills to American as security for the construction
loan. I fail to see how it proves that Mast had actual notice
of a deed of trust that was not even executed until after the
subordination agreement was signed.
I am concerned that, under the majority's reasoning, no
person who supplies material or labor on a construction job
bigger than a child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve lien
priority over an entity that loans money on the project. Every
materialman on any job big enough to look like it requires
financing will be charged with knowing or having reason to know
that, at some unknown future time, the lender will require the
borrower to execute a deed of trust to secure a loan. This
result undermines the purpose of the mechanics' lien statute,
which is "to protect those who have added directly to the value
of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon

860355-CA

8

it.-

stanton TransPt Cp f Y» PavJlS/ 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341

P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quoted with approval in First of Denver
Mortcr. Inv. v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-25
(1979)). The majority's decision requires the materialman to
become a fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's box in cases
where predictability is needed.
Furthermore, I do not believe that a third party's "actual
notice" can turn an invalid legal instrument into one that
creates a valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of the
third party. In other words, if an instrument of conveyance is
defective in some material way, such that it is ineffective to
create an encumbrance on the subject property notwithstanding
its recording, how can it be legally effective as a superior
lien as against a supplier of materials or labor, even one who
knows (or could guess) that it is in existence? Significantly,
the statute relied upon by the majority, Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-6 (1986), makes an instrument valid and binding against
a third party with actual notice even though it is "without
such acknowledgment, certification or record[ing]" as the
statutes require. The statute does not make an instrument with
other material defects^ such as those alleged in this case,
valid and binding against either a party to the legally
defective instrument or a third party with actual notice of it.
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant issues are:
(1) was the trust deed, as recorded on April 8, legally
effective to create a lien, with the result that its recording
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the world of American's
lien from that date? and (2) if so, did work commence on the
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1988), prior to
April 8?
I agree with the trial court that the alleged defects and
omissions in the April 8 trust deed did not deprive it of legal
validity or recordability and that one lien claimant's
placement of a temporary power panel and coil of wire at the
project construction site on April 6, on the ground next to a
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient notice that the
materialman's work had commenced. See Western Morta. Loan
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437,
439 (1967); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App.
1987). I therefore join in the affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court.

Norma*?! H. Jackson,^fudge
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BEFORE THE COURT OP APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION,
a Colorado Corporation, et al.r
Docket No. 860355-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
AND NOT FOR DELAY

MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants,

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that he believes
that the foregoing petition for rehearing is submitted in good
faith and not for purposes of delay.

Ronald C. Barker & Mitchell R. ^
Barker, attorneys for Ron Mast
and Mast Construction Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid, the 19th day of July, 1988, to Warren
Patten, Esq. and W. Cullen Battle, Esq., 215 South State, 12th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

